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The study in brief1
An important element of firms’ management 
control systems is the practice of establishing 
targets for future performance. Such practices 
serve to organize and coordinate firms’ decisions 
and form the basis for performance evaluation 
and compensation. We provide novel empirical 
evidence about firms’ target-setting practices 
based on a survey of compensation practices 
at 666 entities. We examine the extent to 
which firms use past performance as a basis 
for setting earnings targets in their annual 
bonus plans and assess the implications of such 
targets for managerial incentives. Perhaps the 
key finding is about “target ratcheting“ where 
prior studies find that firms revise performance 
targets upwards when their managers exceed 
prior-year targets, yet do not revise targets (or 
revise targets less) downwards when managers 
fail to meet prior-year targets. These target 
ratcheting practices are interpreted as evidence 
of counterproductive incentives because they 
presumably motivate managers to withhold 
effort in order to avoid difficult targets in the 
future. We argue that this interpretation is 
incomplete and makes inconsistent assumptions 
about how information about prior-year 
performance is used when setting future targets.
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Target Ratcheting
Here is one diehard maxim of business: don’t overshoot your 
budget target because next thing you know your target for 
next year will be tougher yet. Target ratcheting at work; that 
is, when you do better than target, your next target is even 
higher, but when you do worse, your target won’t be reduced. 
So why shoot yourself in the foot? Add to this the common 
belief in budgeting settings that either you spend it or lose it, 
and thus arises the motivation to not only “not overshoot“ 
but “spend more“ to boot. A double whammy: leave money 
unearned and spend more than is necessary.
Clearly, such budgeting practices like target ratcheting create 
counterproductive incentives because they motivate managers 
to withhold effort to avoid difficult targets in the future. 
This may be a truism, but it is only half true at best, literally, 
as suggested by our research1 because there is an implicit 
inter-temporal dimension to budgeting consisting of credible 
manager performance and firm commitment.
Specifically, we find that firms do not lightly increase targets 
and, against what the maxim above would suggest, actually 
commonly reduce earnings targets when their managers fail to 
meet prior-year targets – but that is for their well-performing 
managers only. Conversely, however, we find that, for the 
not-so-well-performing managers, the standard ratcheting 
axiom appears to apply (which makes it half true); that is, 
firms increase earnings targets when these managers meet or 
exceed prior-year targets but rarely decrease their targets.
This suggests that good managers are not punished for 
either their one-off misses or overshoots. Managers with 
less credit, however, face less forgiveness: target overshoots 
are seen as overdue whereas shortfalls suggest that pressure 
needs to be kept on.
Thus we find no evidence that good performance in one 
period renders future targets more difficult to achieve.  
To the contrary, we show that earnings targets for managers 
in high-profitability entities are relatively easy-to-achieve and 
more likely to be revised downwards than earnings targets for 
managers in low-profitability entities. This shows, importantly, 
that the target-revision process is not invariant to managerial 
type. Instead, well-performing managers appear to receive 
informational rents that persist through time while their 
counterpart managers do not.
Are these rents potentially problematic? If firms can reasonably 
credibly distinguish their managerial types, then either type’s 
incentives are improved: the well-performing ones are not 
prompted to leave money on the table while the others are 
kept focused on meeting tough targets. Hence, there is a 
degree of serial correlation of target difficulty over time, 
which suggests that firms at least implicitly consider longer-
term performance in budgeting (which, by the way, debunks 
another myth).
Of course, I suspect this can’t go on for too long for either 
type of manager (although our research could not explicitly 
answer this question). In the poor-performing businesses 
where targets are tough to achieve, avoiding missing target 
is essential, not only for the firm to improve profitability, but 
also for the manager, well, to keep the job. Not only is there 
typically no bonus in years where target is being missed, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that managers only “enjoy“ a 
few chances to not meet target. And how about the managers 
who have been meeting or exceeding target and enjoy 
some rents? This, too, will only last so long, as their targets 
are merely comparatively easier, not necessarily plain easy. 
Businesses change, and so even if there is less internal pressure 
for a while, there is no basis for any manager to rest on their 
laurels lest they will find themselves amongst the not-so-well-
performing sort in no time.
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